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ABSTRACT 
Economists have long advocated the use of economic incentives, 
rather than detailed regulations, as a means for combatting 
environmental pollution. In the late 1970s, environmental regulators 
in the United States began experimenting with one such method � 
emissions permits that, within important limits, can be traded among 
sources of pollution. This paper explores the feasibility of an 
extreme version of the marketable permits approach, one in which all 
source-specific regulations are replaced with tradable emissions 
permits. First, the general "'gument for a marketable permits system 
is presented, including a discussion of the legal procedures that are 
required by each of the major alternative methods for effecting 
improvements in environmental quality. Then, the implementation 
problems of a permits market are explored. Because this is partly an 
empirical problem, this analysis is presented in the context of an 
example: particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles atmosphere. 
Finally, some specific design possibilities are presented, and 
compared to the early experiments with tradable permits. 
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In the decade of the 1970s, the United States Government 
vigorously pursued a policy to reduce substantially the pollution of 
the nation's air and water. Beginning with the Clean Air Act in 1963, 
a series of laws were passed that expanded the role of the federal 
government in setting and enforcing environmental policy goals, that 
set substantially more ambitious goals in terms of the purity of air 
and water, and that increased dramatically the resources available for 
writing and enforcing pollution regulations. Although all the returns 
are not in and considerable disagreement about the exact figures 
remains, a reasonable estimate of the cost ot environmental regulation 
is in the range of thirty to fifty billion dollars annually. In some 
inaustries, such as chemicals, electric power generation and mining, 
the cost of compliance with environmental regulation accounts for as 
much as 10 percent ot investment expenditures, and 5 percent of 
* The research reported in this paper was supported by a grant from 
the California Air Resources Board. The author gratefully acknowledges 
the helpful comments and criticisms on an earlier draft by Glen R. Cass 
and Robert W. Hahn. 
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annual sales.
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Whether these expenditures are worthwhile depends, of course, 
on the benefits from environmental regulation. As with costs, there 
is some disagreement about the etf ect of environmental policies on 
pollution, but the consensus is that, while progress has been made, 
the nation is still a long way from attaining the stated goals of 
environmental policy.2 Indeed, there is enough agreement on this
point that ail of the major groups in the environmental policy arena 
-- business, environmental protection organizations, politicians, and 
regulatory authorities -- now generally favor substantial reform ot 
the regulatory process. And the most widely supported direction of 
reform is to introduce a greater measure of decentralized 
decisionmaking, guided by economic incentives, as a substitute for 
regulatory rules promulgated by government. 
This paper reviews one area of environmental policy � air 
pollution controls -- in which the transition to a more incentive-
based regulatory mechanism has been underway since 1977, when 
amendments to the Clean Air Act enabled the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to adopt a more flexible approach to regulation than the 
traditional method of setting standards for each specific source of 
pollution. E PA's new approach is commonly called marketable (or 
1 For sorue data on tliese points, see Cost of Government 
Regulation Study for the Business Roundtable (Arthur Anderson 
and Co., March 1979). 
2 Annual reports ot the U.S. Government's Council 
Environmental Quality show steady but slow decline 
concentration ot most air and water pollutants. 
on 
in the 
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tradable) emissions permits, whereby pollution sources can buy, sell 
or trade emissions ot various pollutants as long as the overall 
objectives of environmental policy are not sacrificed. To understand 
fully how marketable permits are being implemented requires some 
knowledge of the details of the standard-setting process that is being 
replaced; hence the first section ot the paper describes the most 
important features of the old approach. This section is intended to 
summarize a vast literature on American regulatory institutions. The 
second section of the paper discusses the advantages and problems 
associated with implementing more decentralized, market-oriented 
approches to environmental regulation. Host of the important 
questions about implementation depend upon empirical, rather than 
theoretical, issues, and so the discussion in this section is in the 
context ot a particular case study: the regulation of sulfur oxides 
emissions in the Los Angeles air shed. The third section of the paper 
describes the methods that E PA has adopted for making the transition 
to a marketable permits system, and evaluates the progress to date. 
This section also contains some conclusions about how best to 
implement this change. 
I. AIR PuLL UTION REG ULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The environmental legislation that was passed in the United 
States between the mid-1960s and late 1970s was but a part ot a larger 
political change. For a number of reasons, the issue of preventive 
health and safety measures became of high importance ·to political 
leaders. At the same time that environmental laws were being written, 
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so, too were tough laws regarding constaner products and occupational 
health and safety. The environmental laws that were passed in this 
context were def ended on the grounds that pollution represented a 
significant threat to public health.3 
In this milieu, the principal objective of air pollution 
controls became to reduce emissions to the point that they produced no 
deleterious health effects. Federal regulators were charged with the 
responsibility of establishing ambient air quality standards -- e.g., 
maximum limits on the concentration of various pollutants in the 
atmosphere � that were low enough to guarantee the absence of hazards 
to health. This is, of course, a highly controversial policy 
objective, for it implies an infinite value to human health: !!ri. 
expense is justified to reduce air pollution as long as .!RY. adverse 
health effect, however minor, is observed. Moreover, if there is no 
threshold of pollution below which there are no health effects, the 
implication of the policy is zero emissions -- a goal that probably is 
technically impossible to achieve in a modern, industrialized society. 
Because or the difficulty of determining the maximum concentration 
that produces no health effects, very few ambient air quality 
standards have yet been established. Nevertheless, the goal of zero 
adverse health effects remains the objective of air pollution 
regulation and the basis for ambient air quality standards. 
3 For a detailed study of this issue, see Lester B. Lave and 
Eugene P. Seskin, Air Pollution and Human Health (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 
1977). 
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Setting Source-Specific Standards 
For regions that do not satisfy ambient air quality standards, 
the next step is to develop a plan for achieving compliance. For 
regions that do meet the standards, the next step is to adopt a policy 
for preventing significant deterioration of air quality. 
In this phase the full complexity of the American federal 
system is apparent. The role of the federal government is essentially 
to detine the characteristics of an acceptable plan, allowing the 
states to work out the details within the federal guidelines. The 
resulting state strategy for reducing pollution is called a State 
Implementation Plan (SIP), and it must be approved by EPA or else the 
latter can take over air quality regulation in the state. 
For areas that are not in compliance with ambient air quality 
standards, the basic approch of the SIP is to specify abatement 
standards for each source of pollution, where a source is normally 
defined as a point at which emissions occur. Thus, a complicated 
production facility, such as an oil refinery or a steel mill, may have 
several points at which emissions are released, and hence be regulated 
as several different independent sources. Federal ground rules 
require that states identify the significant sources, develop 
regulations for controlling their emissions, and adopt a timetable for 
bringing these sources into compliance. 
A major problem in developing source-specific regulations is 
that the relationship between the amount and pattern of emissions and 
measured ambient air quality is often quite complex and poorly 
understood. In only a few parts ot the nation has the relationship 
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between emissions and air quality been estimated relatively well. In 
most areas, the basic dat a that are necessary to estimate such a 
relationship 
measurements 
long-term time series of emissions and air quality 
either are unav ailable, are unreliable, or have only 
been collected for a few ye ars. As a result, the relationship between 
source-specific st andards and the extent to which gains are made in 
achieving ambient air quality standards is highly uncertain. In 
response to this difficulty, EPA allows a state to adopt a SIP without 
direct reference to whether the resulting emissions will satisfy 
ambient air quality standards. If a region does not satisfy the 
ambient air quality standards, its plan is acceptable if it requires 
that sources adopt the best available control technology by a 
specified target date, usually in the mid to late 1980s. The 
presumption is that this �ill attain air quality objectives. If not, 
state regulators must later adopt more draconian measures, such as 
shutting down some polluting facilities or curtailing automobile 
travel; however, whether these measures will ever actually be imposed 
is a matter of uncertainty and disagreement. 
Regardless of whether a region is in compliance with air 
quality standards, a plan must be developed by state and local 
authorities for preventing further substantial deterioration of air 
quality due to the entry or expansion of polluting facilities. This, 
too, in practice amounts to setting in place a process for writing 
source-specific standards. Although the definition of what 
constitutes substantial degradation varies among regions, in many 
cases the standards for new sources amount to a requirement that there 
be no net increase in emissions � th at is, a net zero discharge 
requirement for new sources. 
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The SIP procedure gives state and local regulatory authorities 
the job of identifying the appropriate standards for each source, old 
and new, in their jurisdiction. Because the best abatement technology 
normally depends on specific technical features of a source, in most 
instances general standards for a broad class of sources are not 
attempted. With a few exceptions, state and local governments are 
free to identify the best abatement technology for each source, given 
its special characteristics. The few exceptions are standards for 
extremely important sources that the federal government has decided to 
set itself, such as emissions limits for automobiles and for newly 
constructed coal-burning electric generation facilities -- although 
even in these cases the states can set their own standards as long as 
they set even more demanding regulations than the federal standards. 
In principle, two kinds of source-specific standards can be 
set. Input standards specify the technical method to be adopted by 
the firm for reducing emissions. Examples are requiring facilities 
that burn coal or oil to install stack-gas scrubbers or specifying the 
maximum permissible amount of sulfur and other impurities that are 
allowed in fuel. Performance standards specify the maximum 
permissible emissions from a source, but allow the regulted entity to 
choose whatever control technology it prefers so long as the emissions 
ceiling is not exceeded. 
In practice, source-specific standards as they h ave been 
developed in the United States are a hybrid of these two approaches. 
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Regardless of how a standard is formally expressed, the method for 
developing it is to try to identify the best control technology and to 
establish the emissions that would result if that technology were 
used. Even if the standard is expressed in performance terms, a firm 
that prefers to use another method to achieve its allowed emissions 
level normally must obtain advance approval. The regulatory 
authorities will require proof that the alternative method is as 
effective as the one upon which the standard was based. 
There are two reasons for a heavy reliance by regulators on 
specifying the abatement technology to be adopted by polluters. One 
is that the states must convince EPA that the SIP represents a good-
faith etfort to achieve air quality objectives. Because relatively 
few areas know the relationship between emissions and air quality and, 
therefore, can make reasonably accurate predictions of the air quality 
results of their SIP, the most effective strategy for demonstrating 
that a SIP is reasonable is to show that all of the sources will be 
required to use the best technology for reducing emissions. A second 
reason is that source-specific standards must be developed in a formal 
regulatory process according to a set of procedural standards.4 An 
enormous body of law in the United States -- Constitutional, statutory 
and common � protects the private sector against arbitrary and 
unreasonable confiscation ot wealth by the government. Decisions of a 
regulatory authority must be based upon the evidence submitted in a 
4 For a more complete discussion ot the nature of the regulatory 
process and how process affects policy, see Roger G. Noll, 
"Breaking Out of the Regulatory Dilemma: Alternatives to the 
Sterile Choice," Indiana Law Journal 51, no. 3 0976):686-99. 
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formal, public process in which anyone who is significantly affected 
by the decisLon has an opportunity to participate. The decisions must 
be reasonably and rationally based on the evidence, and must be 
clearly derived from the statutory responsibilities of the regulator. 
The regulatory authority bears the burden of proving that the 
regulation is not capricious and arbitrary (e.g., is rationally based 
upon substantial evidence). 
The decisions of the regulator can be appealed in the courts. 
To withstand these legal challenges, regulators must be able to prove 
the reasonableness of each standard. Normally this means that the 
regulator must show that the standard is feasible, and that it will 
make progress towards reducing emissions. If the regulator fails to 
show that emissions will be substantially reduced (e.g., a performance 
standard) by a specific, verifiable technique (e.g., an input 
standard), the regulated firm and environmentalist groups have grounds 
on which to appeal the decision in the courts. In fact, appeals of 
standards are commonplace, in part because the evidentiary basis is 
often snaky, but also in part because firms can delay the imposition 
of a costly standard by exercising their full rights of appeal through 
the judicial system. 
Problems of the Present Approach 
The standard-setting regulatory process has proven to have a 
number of important shortcomings.
5 
5 For a more complete discussion of the problems of the present 
regulatory system, see Allen V. Kneese and Charles L. Schultze, 
Pollution, Prices and Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1975). 
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First, the process is expensive and time-consuniing, requiring 
numerous technical studies by all of the adversaries in a regulatory 
process, rebuttals of these studies, and formal hearings. The costs 
and delays inherent in the process have made progress in developing 
S!Ps much slower than was anticipated. Moreover, the attention on 
technical, source-specific standards has deflected attention and 
resources -- away from developing good data on emissions and air 
quality, and hence has inhibited air quality modeling. Thus, over a 
decade after having begun to regulate air quality seriously, most 
local and state regulators are still largely in the dark about the 
likely effects of the regulations that are being proposed and adopted. 
Second, the process is economically inefficient in that vast 
differences emerge among firms in costs per unit of abated emissions. 
Some production processes are easier to understand than others, and 
the costs and efficacy of abatement techniques are known with 
differing degrees or certainty. As a result, the maximal feasible 
extent to which regulators can be successful legally in forcing 
abatement varies from firm to firm. These differences are especially 
great between old and new sources of emissions.6 
Third, the policy erects entry barriers against new and 
expanding firms. These barriers are of two forms: the generally 
higher standards applied to new sources, and the requirement to go 
through a time-consuming process in which production plans are made a 
6 See Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty 
Air (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). 
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public record that is available to competitors. To the extent that 
entry is retarded, competition and technological change are inhibited. 
Fourth, the process creates perverse incentives with respect 
to technological innovation in abatement methods.7 Because of the 
repermitting process, the adoption of an innovation is delayed until 
regulatory approvals are obtained for each source that can use it. 
Moreover, the expense of the process detracts from the attraction of 
cost-reducing abatement technologies. And, while manufacturers of 
abatement equipment have an incentive to invent ways to increase the 
abatement of emissions, polluting firms have no incentive to reduce 
their emissions below their currently active standard. Consequently, 
the latter can be expected to resist .!l!. improvements in abatement 
technology that involve any additional expense. In addition, the 
incentives for improving abatement technology focus primarily on 
separable technical fixes e.g., specific pieces of equipment or 
other changes in input -- as opposed to innovations in manufacturing 
processes because the formal regulatory process is better equipped to 
deal with the former. 
As a practical matter, elimination of the quasi-judicial 
regulatory process is not possible in the United States, deriving as 
it does from Constitutional principles having widespread political 
support. But even if it were possible to simplify the process and 
7 For a well-documented sample, see Richard E. Ayers, 
"Enforcement of Air Pollution Controls on Stationary Sources 
under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, " Ecology Law 
Quarterly 4, no. 3(1975):441-78). 
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make it more like European environmental regulatory processes,8 some 
of the problems of standards remain. The absence of appropriate 
economic incentives to improve the methods of emissions control and 
the dependence on officials outside of polluting entities to make 
technical abatement decisions create situations in which inefficient 
results are likely. The delays and formal burden of proof in the 
American system contribute to these problems, but are not the only 
important cause of them. 
II. ADVANTAGES AND PROBLEMS OF TRADABLE EMISSIONS PERMITS
Tradable emissions permits are one example of a general 
category of enviroIIDlental regulatory methods that rely on market 
incentives, rather than source-specific regulations, to achieve policy 
objectives. The other leading examples are emissions taxes and 
abatement bounties. 
Tradable emissions permits are somewhat related to the 
regulatory system currently in place. Source-specific standards 
either state directly or imply a legal ceiling on emissions rates for 
each source. Thus, they can be interpretted as permits to release 
given amounts ot emissions. A natural way to conceive of a tradable 
emissions permits system is as a modification of the present implicit 
8 For descriptions ot European regulatory systems with contrasts 
to the American process, see Blair T. Bower, "Mixed
Implementation Incentive Systems for Water Quality Management in 
France, the Ruhr and the United States," Conference on 
International Comparisons of the Implementation Process in 
Environmental Regulation, March 1981; and Steven Kelman, 
Regulating America, Regulating Sweden (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1981). 
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emissions permits in which firms in a region can rearrange the pattern 
of emissions by exchanging their permits. Firms would report to 
regulators changes in their permit holdings in order to facilitate 
enforcement; however, they would not need advance approval for 
transactions. 
Emissions taxes are a charge per unit of emissions that is 
levied on all sources in a region. An abatement bounty is like an 
emissions tax, except that firms are paid a subsidy in proportion to 
the emissions reductions that they achieve. 
The underlying principle of all of these systems is the same. 
Polluters are given an incentive to reduce emissions, but the choice 
of the abatement technique is left to their discretion. And, because 
all polluters face the same set of incentives, rational decentralized 
responses will lead to the attainment of any given regional emissions 
target at minimum total costs. 
A second advantage of incentive-based approaches is that they 
avoid a major part of the process costs of controlling pollution. 
With taxes, bounties or tradable permits, government need not be in 
the business of specifying the technology of abatement or setting the 
emissions limits for each specific source. The principal task of 
regulators under incentive-based systems is to define overall 
objectives in terms of environmental quality and total emissions, and 
to enforce compliance with the system that generates the incentives, 
including the measurement of performance by each source. Both of 
these responsibilities are, of course, features of the system of 
source-specific standards. 
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A third advantage of incentive-based approaches is that they 
do a better job of promoting advances in abatement technology. In all 
three systems, emissions are costly to a firm because they result in 
either taxes, the necessity to hold monetizable emissions permits, or 
a foregone opportunity to collect a bounty for reducing them. 
Consequently, polluters have a continuing incentive to search for less 
costly, more effective abatement methods. Thus, a firm that invents a 
better abatement technique finds a willing market, rather than a 
source of opposition to the adoption of the new method. 
Advantages of Tradable Permits 
The special advantages -- and problems -- of tradable 
emissions permits have been widely discussed in general, theoretical 
terms in the economics literature.9 Only a brief review will be 
presented here. 
One advantage of tradable permits in comparison with taxes and 
bounties is that they do not necessarily require involvement in the 
fiscal processes ot government. The source-specific standards 
approach gives away its implicit emissions permits, and so, too, can a 
system in which the permits are tradable. This avoids the political 
issues associated with either taxing or subsidizing industry. Indeed, 
literally any wealth effect of taxes or bounties can be reproduced by 
9 See J. H. Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1968); W. David Montgomery, 
"Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs," 
Journal of Economic Theory 5 (1972):395-418; and Thomas H.  
Teitenberg, "Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of 
Stationary Source Air Pollution: A Survey and Synthesis," Land 
Economics 56(1980):391-416. 
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the choice of allocating permits: auctioning them is equivalent to an 
emissions tax, while granting permits equal to original emissions and 
then purchasing them is equivalent to an emissions-reduction bounty. 
Thus, the tradable permits approach allows a separation between the 
equity issues of who should pay and the efficiency issue of how to 
minimize the costs ot achieving the policy objective. 
A second characteristic � not necessarily an advantage or 
disadvantage -- of tradable permits has to do with the ways in which 
the uncertainties of the regulatory process are distributed.lo Like 
the system ot source-specific standards, tradable emissions permits 
specify the total emissions of a given pollutant in a given geographic 
area. Unlike source-specific standards, the geographic distribution 
of emissions � and hence of pollution � is not specified. 
Consequently, in the absence of a good model for estimating the 
distribution of emissions that a market would produce and another good 
model for estimating the effects of this pattern of emissions on 
pollution, tradable emissions permits are somewhat more uncertain than 
source-specific standards in terms of the resulting quality of the 
environment. Similarly, in the absence of the same kind of modeling 
capability, a given tax on emissions or bounty on emissions reductions 
will produce uncertainty in the distribution of emissions � and on 
lO For a more complete treatment of this subject, see A. Michael 
Spence and Martin L. Weitzman, "Regulatory Strategies for 
Pollution Control," in Anne F. Friedlander, editor, Approaches 
to Controlling Air Pollution (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
l 'J7 8); and Marc J. Roberts and A. Michael Spence, "Effluent 
Charges and Licenses under Uncertainty," Journal of Public 
Economics 5 (1976):193-208. 
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total emissions as well, since neither system imposes limits on total 
emissions . Hence,  taxes and bounties are more uncertain than tradable 
permits in terms of their effects on environmental quality. 
A similar story can be told on the cost side . In the American 
system of setting hybrid standards having both performance and input 
dimensions, compl iance costs are est imated as part of the regulatory 
process. These estimates vary, sometimes drama tically, so they must 
be regarded as uncertain even after the standard is adopted . A 
tradable permits system in which the implicit permits in current 
standards are made marketable has greater cost uncertainty; however, 
because the permits are voluntarily exchanged , the greater uncertainty 
arises because pol luters may find an amount of cost-reducing trades ot 
permits that is unknown in advance . Hence the added uncertainty 
arises solely because of the possibility of lower costs . 
In the case of taxes and bounties, a distinction must be made 
between resource costs and the expenditures on taxes or bounties . 
Because the amount of abatement resulting from any g iven tax or bounty 
is uncertain, so, too , is the resource cost of abatement . However, 
the total cost is bounded by the product of the tax (or bounty) and 
the initial amount of emissions. If firms do opt for zero discharge , 
it is because the cost of complete aba tement is less than the maximum 
possible tax or bounty payment. A similar argument shows that the 
expenditures on taxes or bounties are also uncertain, but bounded in 
the same fashion. 
From the standpo int ot a firm , the sum of emissions taxes and 
abatement costs is like ly to be less uncertain than the sum of 
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abatement costs and the costs of obtaining permits in a system of 
marketable permits. The announcement of an emissions tax conveys more 
information about potential tax liabilit ies and abatement costs than 
is conveyed by the announcement of the tradabil ity of emissions 
permits. The reason is tha t in the latter case the price of the 
permits must still be determined by the market and will always have 
some degree of random variability. 
A third feature of tradable emissions permits is that they 
have advantages with respect to enforcement requirements . Taxes and 
bounties -- at least in their most efficient forms -- depend on total 
emissions . Hence the quantity of emissions must be measured in a 
manner that produces a legally enforceable measurement of total 
quantity. In some cases, direct and continuous measurement can be 
avoided, such as by making occasional spo t checks of processes that 
produce a constant rate of emissions or by performing a mass balance 
analysis on inputs and outputs to the production process. But in most 
instances the measurement requirements for estimating total emissions 
are quite demanding . 
Tradable permits do not require an estimate of to tal 
emissions, but a determination of whether the firm is releasing more 
or less emissions than are permitted .  Spot checks , when backed by 
appropriately calculated noncompliance fines that make compliance an 
optimal strategy, are more likely to be feasible with tradable permits 
than the o ther incentive-based methods . Even if continuous monitoring 
is adopted, the technical requirements are easier, for all that need 
be measured is whether emissions are above or below a given limi t .  
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Mechanisms that are very simple,  even simpler than the methods now in 
use -- e.g . ,  optical scanning of stack emissions, or chemical 
dosime ters like litmus paper or the radiation detectors worn by 
workers in areas that can be contaminated by radiation -- can be used 
to detect whether a firm is in compliance without measuring the actual 
amount ot emissions. In this way, tradable permits are comparable to 
any performance-based,  source-specific emissions standard . And , like 
performance standards, tradable permits usually present more difficult 
enforcement problems than input standards because the latter require 
only an observation that a required technical fix is in place . 
A fourth characteristic of tradable permits is that they can 
relatively easily accommodate economic growth . As economic expansion 
in a region proceeds, the optimal amount of emissions � and the 
opt imal pattern of abatement among sources is likely to change . A 
system of source-specific standards cannot readily accommodate this 
reality , because to do so requires rewriting the standards for every 
source in the region. Consequently, present procedures and policies 
impose far heavier burdens on new and expanding firms than on old 
sources, with dileterious effects on economic change as described 
above . Emissions taxes , too , must be adjust ed as the economic 
structure of a region changes ,  for if not environmental quality will 
de teriorate in direct proportion to economic growth -- a result that 
is no t likely to be correct. If firms are allowed to enter before the 
tax is adjusted to their presence , legal problems can arise , not to 
mention political problems, if the new level of the tax makes the 
entrant economically unviable . In any case , the ex ante emissions tax 
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g ives false signals to potential entrants. Moreover, unless the 
emissions consequences of the entrant are examined fairly closely , as 
in the present source-specific standards , regulators do not know how 
the tax should be adjusted. Abatement bounties present similar 
problems , but in addition they actually encourage the entry of 
polluting industries into heavily polluted areas . 1 1  If a firm can
expect its abatement costs to be subsidized , it will have diminished 
incentive to take into account the social costs of environmental 
degradation in selecting a location for a fac ility. Indeed , if the 
abatement bounty is high enough to produce voluntary abatement, 
investments to control emissions can enhance profitability by the 
maximal amount only in heavily polluted areas (where presumably the 
bounty is highest) . As with taxes , the solution to the problem is ex 
ante review of entrants to decide through a regulatory process whether 
entry is desirable,  thereby undermining the advantages of an 
incentive-based regulatory system . 
Tradable emissions permits allow entry to occur without 
advance approval by the acquisition of permits in the market . 
Regulators may then, ex post , adjust the number of permits , or may 
even have a long-term plan for gradually changing the number of 
permits in order to accommodate growth . 
In the context of existing regula tory policy in the United 
States ,  with ambient air quality standards based upon the goal of 
1 1  For a comparison of the effects of taxes and bounties on 
entry, see R. Talbot Page, "Failure of Bribes and Standards for 
Pollution Abatement," Natural Resources Journal 13 ( 1976) :677-
704 . 
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eliminating adverse health effects, environmental quality will not be 
allowed to deteriorate with economic growth, even though this might be 
the more efficient option. The advantages of a system of tradable 
permits in this case are even greater, for it is the only method that 
can accommodate entry without ex ante review of the emis s ions of the 
entrant . In order to prevent an increase in total emissions, taxes 
and bounties would have to be adjusted for all sources by an amount 
necessary to leave emissions unchanged . Thus, only tradable permits 
escape source-by-source regulatory r eview of each new or expanding 
polluting entity. 
The preceding discussion suggests that the case for 
experimenting with tradable emiss ions permits is strong, justifying 
close examination ot the implementation problems associated with such 
a system. Indeed, there are some aspects of a tradable permits 
approach that raise important design questions . 
Des ign Problems for Tradable Permits 
The main purpose ot a tradable permits system is to convey to 
polluters - new and old - appropriate price signals about the social 
cost ot emissions so that each can select a combination of capital 
investments, operating practices and emissions releases that minimize 
the sum of abatement costs and permits costs . The economic efficiency 
of the system depends on firms being able to buy and sell permits 
relatively easily, with incidental transactions costs, at competitive 
prices. The principal implementation problems associated with a 
tradable permits syst em are related to the question of whether these 
conditions for an efficient market can be satisfied. 
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One problem i s  the possibility of "thin" markets - that is, 
markets in which transactions are rare, and in which few firms are 
willing to buy or sell . In such a situation, the transactions co sts 
of trading permits can prevent the market from being much of an 
improvement over source-specific standards . If a firm that seeks to 
buy permits must invest substantial time and resources in f inding a 
potential trading partner, and then engage in b ilateral negotiations 
to determine a price, the ability of the permits market to f ind a 
cost-minimizing total cost of achieving ambient air quality standards 
is undermined.  Moreover, infrequent trades arranged through 
negotiations are less likely to convey clear price signals to 
potential entrants, firms contemplating expansion, or sources 
considering further abatement and the sale of some emissions permits .  
A second problem i s  related t o  the structure of the permits 
market . In some air sheds, one or two f irms can account for a very 
large share ot emissions . Moreover, there is some tendency for 
regulators to require somewhat greater abatement efforts from the 
largest firms . In this situation, if a tradable permits system is 
initiated by making tradable the emis sions permits that are implicit 
in current standards, it is  conceivable that only one or two f irms 
will be seeking to buy permits, with all o ther firms seeking to be 
seller s .  If so, the market may not settle on the competitive 
equilibrium price, but a monopsonistic price instead . More generally, 
the degree to which a market diverges from the competitive ideal 
depends on the initial allocation of permits, and in any s ituation it 
is technically possible to pick an initial al location that produces a 
monopoly or a monopsony. 12 Thus , a design problem for a tradable
permits market is to avoid an initial allocation that has this 
property. 
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A third problem has to do with the definition of markets and 
permits . As discussed briefly above, the relationship between 
emissions and pollution is often very complex. Pollution at any given 
receptor point is the consequence of emis sions from several locations,  
and orten depends on their interactions as wel l .  Similarly , every 
source of pollution has a unique pattern of polluting effects ,  which, 
because or interactions , may also depend on emissions from other 
sources . In general, to achieve theoretical efficiency ( ignoring 
transaccions costs and possible market imperfections) requires a 
separate market for each point where pollution damage occurs , and a 
separate transformation function for each source of pollution that 
maps its holdings in pollution permits at any source to its emissions 
allowances .  Of course, this degree of complexity is impractical to 
implement . Hence,  an important design problem is to make 
simplifications in the definition of permits and regions in which 
permits are valid that do not sacrifice too much in the way of the 
potential efficiencies ot a market mechanism. At one extreme , a large 
geographic region can be treated as one market ,  with the implication 
that the region will be treated as one large mixing bow l in which 
emissions from all sources are uniformly spread acros s  the region. As 
12 For a complete analysis of this problem, see Robert W. Hahn, 
"An As sessment of the Viability of Marketable Permits , "  Ph. D .  
Dissertation, Cal ifornia Institute o f  Technology , May 1981 . 
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a description of reality, no pollution problem -- not even emissions 
into standing bodies of water -- has this fully mixed property ; 
however, as a practical matter it may be a workable assumption. A 
somewhat more complicated strategy is to define a few receptor points 
at which pollution is measured and require firms to purchase emissions 
permits for pol lution at each receptor point where their emissions 
cause pollution. 
The best way to organize the market -- the definition of a 
permit and the sources that must hold it -- depends only in part on 
the physical aspects of the pollution problem. It also depends on the 
economic incentives operating upon sources . If abatement co st 
functions for al l sources lead to more or less the same degree of 
abatement ( e .g . ,  they are all reducing emissions by roughly the same 
proportion ) ,  a permits market that is defined crudely , even wildly 
incQrrectly, as a mixing bowl may still be workable.  In the worst 
case -- in which each receptor point is polluted by only one source 
the cost-minimizing distribution of emis sions may still produce 
approximtely the same amount of abatement at all source s .  
In most  regions , pollution problems exhibit both kinds of 
characteristics : localized, single-source pol lution, and effects from 
the combined emissions of many sources . A plume from a smokestack may 
be the primary cause of pollution on receptors a few miles downwind, 
but as distance from the stack increases its emissions will mingle 
with the releases from other facil ities . To take an extreme example,  
the problem of acid rain in Canada, New York and New England is  
probably the cumulative effect of emissions from literally thousands 
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of sources ,  some more than a thousand miles away. Whether a tradable 
permits market i s  workable, then, depends on the relative importance 
of the local versus long-distance effect s ,  and on the likely pattern 
of abatement that will  emerge from the market .  
A fourth issue in the design of a tradable permits system is 
its flexibility with respect to changes in ambient air quality or 
total emissions target s .  Because the relationship between emis s ions 
and air quality and the effect of air quality on health are not well 
understood, there is  a good chance that new knowledge will cause 
regulators to want to change emissions levels .  A decision to create 
more permits  is relatively straightforward to deal with ;  regulators 
can give away or sel l some net increment to the total emissions rights 
in an area. But a deci s ion to reduce the number of permits raises 
potential difficulties . The heart of the issue is  still another 
dimension of the definition of an emissions permit .  Is  i t s  lifetime 
perpetual , or of fixed duration? Can i t  be redefined by fiat , or as 
an outcome of a regulatory process , or must changes in the number of 
permits be accomplished by purchase by the state? Obviously, the ease 
with which the number of permits can be changed depends on the answers 
to these questions . Moreover, a constraining factor on building into 
the permits system a mechanism for changing the number of permits i s  
the etfect o f  the mechanism o n  the willingness o f  firms t o  hold 
permits .  If polluting entities are made t o  believe that the value of 
an emissions permit is subj ect to significant change at the whim of 
the state, abatement strategies � in terms of both the amount of 
abatement and i ts distribution between long-term capital investments 
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and changes in operating methods � are likely to be affected . 
Finally ,  some account needs to be taken of so-called air 
pollution episodes : periods when meteorological conditions are 
exceptionally unfavorable, and so air pollution builds up over a 
number of day s .  To limit emissions t o  a level consistent with good 
air quality on these worst days is  irrational ; it is ,far less costly 
to curtail economic activity for a few days a year than to build in 
abatement capacity that would keep air quality high regardless of the 
weather. The current practice is  to announce the degree of 
unfavorability of conditions a day in advance ,  and to invoke special 
regulations when conditions look especial ly bad . To do something much 
more complicated than thi s  i s  of dubious value , because the frequency 
and magnitude of our pollution episodes is not very high, and will be  
lower still  as l imits on  emissions are lowered. 
The tradable permits system could easily adopt the present 
approach to episode s ,  w ith the emissions permits applying only in the 
vast majority of days when there is no special condition . 
Alternatively , separate emissions permits markets could be 
implemented , one for normal conditions , and one or more for episodes , 
with regulators announcing each day which permits apply tomorrow . 
Because this problem is relatively easy compared to the o ther four , it 
will be ignored for the remainder of this paper . 
Variants in System Design 
The design features available to attack the first four 
problems are as follows . 
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1 .  Permit Life. Regulators could elect to make the 
durability of emissions permits uncertain by stating that they were 
valid until a formal regulatory procedure declared them to be invalid 
or changed the amount of emissions al lowed by a single permit . Such a 
system would create incentives among firms to adopt production methods 
w ith some flexibility in emissions, and to hold more permits than were 
actually used. Alternatively, regulators could define the time period 
in which a permit is valid. At one extreme, permits could be 
perpetual, requiring regulators to buy them back to reduce total 
emissions . Or, regulators could assign a fixed l ife. If regulators 
decided to alter the number of permits, they could do so by allowing 
firms to trade in old permits for new at a specified exchange rate. 
Finally, regulators could have several different kinds of permits : 
some perpetual, some of a fixed, long-term duration, and some with a 
short life (e . g . ,  one year ) . Some periodic variability in the number 
of permits could be accomplished through the process of reissuing the 
permits with the short life ; somewhat greater variability could be 
introduced as the intermediate-duration permits expired. 
2 .  Market Definition. An emissions permit pertains to a 
particular ge�graphic area. The size of the region and the variety of 
permits a source must hold for a given emissions allowance is a design 
feature of the system. Regulators could define emissions permits as 
freely tradable among all sources in a wide geographic area. 
Alternatively, a region could be subdivided into smaller areas, with 
trades between areas either barred or permitted according to some 
transformation of the value of a permit across  area boundaries. Or, 
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markets could be defined according to the location of receptor s .  In 
each area ot the region, a coefficient would be estimated that related 
the effect of a unit of emis sions on ambient air quality at a receptor 
point . Sources could then be required to hold permits to pollute at a 
receptor point equal to their quantity of emissions multiplied by the 
corresponding coefficient . 
3 .  Market Initialization. Regulators must select a method 
for initial ly distributing the permits.  One possibility is to give 
them away according to some rule .  Examples o f  allocation rules are: 
in proportion to precontrol emis sions, in proportion to emissions 
al lowed under existing standards, or equal to the expected equilibrium 
distribution of emissions if abatement co sts were minimized. 
Alternatively, permits could be given to entities other than sources 
of pollution : the poor, schools, etc.,  presumably any of which would 
then elect to sell them. Or the government could al locate the permits 
by auctioning them. The latter two options suggest that sources of 
pol lution would have to pay for permits ; however, this is not 
necessarily the case for a state auction. Ownership of permits could 
be conferred on sources according to one of the rules for giving 
permits away, but sources could then be required to use an auction 
process to allocate the permits among themselves, with the revenues 
from the auction divided among the sources in proportion to their 
ownership shares . 
4. Market Operation. Once an initial allocation has been
made, provisions must also be adopted for later transactions . 
Government could leave the problem of organizing a continuing market 
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to the private sector. Alternatively, g iven the record-keeping 
requirements ot the government for purposes of enforcement , the 
government could act as a marketplace by providing information about 
potential buyers and sel lers to anyone requesting it.  Or the 
government could be more than a passive marketing agent by actually 
requiring regular opportunities for reallocation of permits .  This 
could be accomplished by forcing periodic reauctioning (with proceeds 
redistributed among the sources )  of some fraction of the permits . A 
reauctioning proces s fits natural ly with a system in which permits 
have fixed durations,  for then the replacement of old permits by new 
ones can be accomplished through an auction of the same sort as used 
to accomplish the initial allocation. 
Solving the Design Problem: A Case Study 
The importance of the first four potential problems of a 
tradable permits system depends on the empirical features of the 
emissions problem that the system is designed to solve. The following 
discussion uses a particular example - the control of sul'fate 
particulates in Los Angeles -- to il lustrate how these issues can be 
assessed .  This analysis is based upon relatively complete information 
about abatement costs ,  emissions inventories, and the relationship 
between emissions and air quality throughout the region. Los Angeles 
probably has the most sophisticated regulatory system for air 
pollution in the world , in part because local agencies have been 
collecting emissions and air quality information for two decades and 
in part because these data have been extensively used by research 
scholars to study the Los Angeles air pollution problem. This 
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information, of course,  is especially helpful for illustrating the way 
that issues ot designing a permits market might be resolved and for 
designing a particular set of market institutions for this pollutant 
in this region. It is not necessary , however , to have al l of this 
information in order to move towards a tradable permits system. 
Following the discussion of the Los Angeles sulfate problem, attention 
will be turned to methods of approaching the same design problems when 
the available information is less reliable.  
The problem of sulfate particulates in Los Angeles is somewhat 
unusual in that the state, not the federal government , is solely 
responsible for its regulation. Sulfate particulates are suspected of 
being a health hazard and having other damaging effects ,  but the 
principal justification for controlling them in Los Angeles is that 
they account for a very large part -- probably more than half -- of 
the reduced visibility due to air pollution in Los Angeles. There is 
·no federal ambient air quality standard for sulfate particulates ; 
however ,  the state has adopted a standard of 25 micrograms per cubic 
meter , averaged over a 24-hour period. 
Although sulfates are released directly into the atmosphere by 
some sources , by far the most important cause of sulfates is the 
release and subsequent atmospheric oxidation of 502, nearly all of 
which is associated with petroleum products that contain sulfur as an 
impurity . There is a federal ambient air quality standard for 502; 
however , Los Angeles is not in violation of it . Hence,  the state 
standard for sulfates is  the binding constraint on 502 releases . 
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To control sulfate particulates in Los Angeles requires 
controlling emissions from about forty different categories of 
sources . The mo st important sources are electric utilities that burn 
oil to generate electricity, petroleum refiners ,  coke calciners ,  glass 
manufactur ers,  a steel mill, industries that  are heavy fuel burners ,  
and mobil sources burning gasoline . A tradable  emissions permit 
system must be designed to account for emissions from these maj or 
sources . 
The tools with which to undertake an analysis of the design of 
a permits market in Los Angeles are a detailed model of the 
relationship between emissions and air quality , and estimates of the 
abatement cost functions for all major sources in the region. The 
abatement cost functions provide estimates of the costs to each source 
of various degrees of abatement of its sulfur oxides emissions. A 
firm seeking to minimize the sum of its expenditures on permits and 
its abatement costs would elect to abate up to the point at which the 
marginal cost ot abatement equaled the market price of a permit ; 
therefore,  the abatement co st functions provide a means for predicting 
the quantity of permits that each source would seek to hold at any 
g iven permit price.  When all of the abatement cost  functions are 
combined, the relationship between abatement and permit prices for the 
entire region can be estimated. Thus , given a limit on total 
emissions for the entire region -- e .g . ,  the number of permits to be 
issued � the abatement co st data yield a prediction about the price 
of a permit, the distribution of remaining emissions in the air shed, 
and the expenditures on abatement ( in total and by source) .  
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The abatement cost information was gathered in  the following 
manner . 13 First , public regulatory records and publications were
searched to  find cost estimates for various abatement methods for each 
source . Then, preliminary abatement cost functions were estimated and 
circulated among industry representatives and regulators for comments .  
The responses were then used t o  revise the cost estimates . For most 
sources,  a few discrete abatement options were discovered, each with 
differing costs and levels of abatement . Thus , for most sources the 
abatement cost  function is a step function. 
The model relating emissions to air quality is based upon an 
analysis of detailed measurements of emissions and air quality. 14 Air 
quality estimates are made for each of the seventeen monitoring 
stations in the region, based upon meteorological conditions and the 
pattern ot emissions among the sources in the area. The structure of 
the model is such that the geographical location of the sources and 
measuring stations is specified, so that the effects of changing 
geographical patterns of emissions can be estimated. Thus , the 
patterns of abatement and emissions predicted by the cost model under 
varying assumptions about the design of the permits market can be fed 
13 For a more complete discussion and description of the cost 
data, see Robert W. Hahn, "Data Base and Programming Methodology 
for Marketable Permits Study , "  Open File Report 80-8 , 
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute of 
Technology , 198 1 .  
14 For a detailed description o f  the model ,  see Glen R. Cass,  
"Methods for Sulfate Air Quality Management with Applications to 
Los Angeles , "  Doctoral Dissertation, California Institute of 
Technology, December 197 7 ;  and Glen R. Cas s ,  "Sulfate Air 
Quality Control Strategy Design , "  Atmospheric Environment 15 , 
no . 7 ,  1227 . 
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into the air quality model to predict the results in terms of the 
concentration of sulfate particulates at each of the measuring 
stations . 
One important result of the cost and air quality studies is  
that mobile sources � autos and trucks -- do not need to be dealt 
with directly in a permits system. Accurate air quality forecasts can 
be developed if mobile sources are redefined as fixed traffic sources 
along major arterial streets , using normal traffic densities and 
average auto emissions to calculate the emissions from these pseudo-
fixed sources . Moreover, by far the least expensive method for 
reducing sulfur emissions from vehicles is to reduce the sulfur 
content ot fuel . Consequently , it is feasible -- with little loss of 
efficiency � to allocate responsibility for mobile source emissions 
to distributors of refined products .  Indeed, because Los Angeles 
refines more fuel than is consumed locally, responsibility for mobile 
sources can be pushed even further back in the production process to 
refiners.  This is an important advantage ,  for each automobile emits a 
tiny amount ot sulfur . The transactions cost of forcing vehicle 
owners to purchase emissions permits in very small denominations are 
probably roughly equal to the price of the permit , for the latter is 
unlikely to be more than a few dollars a year. Moreover, to be 
efficient , the auto permits would have to be related to use of fuel , 
which creates a very difficult enforcement task. Thus , allocating 
responsibility for mobile sources to distributors or refiners greatly 
improves  the performance of the permits markets . This result is true 
for sulfur emissions in any region; however, it is not necessarily 
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true for controls on hydrocarbons and NOx' the main components of 
photochemical smog . The reason is that in the latter case some cost-
effective methods for reducing emissions are in control of the vehicle 
owner . Thus , to place responsibility on others -- for example , auto 
manufacturers would entail some loss  of efficiency. This would 
have to be balanced against the greater transactions costs for 
including in the market literal ly millions of holders of small amounts 
of permits . 
The next issue to be attacked is the possibility of an 
imperfectly competitive market structure. The first step in attacking 
this issue is to simulate the competitive allocation of permits .  This 
is achieved by finding the minimum-co st allocation of abatement 
responsibil ities among the sources that achieves a target level of 
total emis sions . A permits market begins with some initial allocation 
rule.  For each source , the difference between the initial al location 
and the competitive allocation is the amount of permits it will buy or 
sell .  By examining these differences ,  the structure of both the 
supply and demand sides of the market can be observed. 
Although numerous market simulations have been made under 
varying assumptions about ambient air quality standards and the 
availabil ity of substitutes for petroleum fuels ,  three examples wil l 
be presented here. 15 One assumes that the state' s ambient air quality
15 For more details about the choice of emissions limits and the
various simulations,  see Robert W. Hahn and Roger G. Noll ,  
"Designing a Market for Tradable Emissions Permits , "  California 
Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper No . 398,  
July 1981 . 
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standards will be satisfied all of the time, the second assumes that 
the standard will be violated approximately two weeks per year , and 
the third assumes that the emissions allowed under regulations now in 
place become freely tradable.  Al l cases assume that the availability 
of natural gas as a fuel for industrial boilers and electric utility 
generation will be as it was in the early 1 97 0 s ,  which means neither 
freely available (as it would be under total deregulation of energy) 
nor completely curtailed (as it was about to be in the late 1 970s  
before natural gas price regulation was eased ) . Under this 
assumption, the controls on sulfur oxides emissions that were 
established in 1977 would produce emis sions of about 300 tons of so2 
equivalent per day in Los Angeles ; to meet the standard al l of the 
time requires that emis sions be cut in half, but to meet it all but 
two weeks per year , on average,  requires a further reduction of only 
about 50 tons per day. Thus , the three cases represent a major 
change,  a minor reduction, and no change in currently enacted (but not 
yet ful ly in place ) source-specific standards . 
The single largest source of emissions is an electric utility . 
In 1 973 , prior to control s ,  this source accounted for approximately 28 
percent ot emissions in Los Angeles . Table 1 shows the share of 
permits that this firm would be expected to hold under two simulated 
market structures for the cases described above. 
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1 .  
2 . 
3 .  
TABLE 1 
FRACTION OF TOTAL EMISSIONS ACCOUNTED FOR 
BY LARGEST PERMIT HOLDER IN LOS ANGELES 
Make existing permits tradable 
with historical gas supplies 
Violate standard two weeks/year 
with historical gas supplies 
Satisfy standard all of the time 
with historical gas supplies 
A. 
Competition 
(percent ) 
48 
43 
32 
B. 
Monopsony 
(percent ) 
33 
40 
32 
y 
Source : Hahn, An Assessment of the Viability of Marketable Permits . 
The shares reported in Table 1 should not be taken too 
literal ly . Two important sources of error could have an important 
effect on these estimates. First ,  treating each source as having a 
few discrete choices of abatement methods and hence facing an 
abatement cost function that is a step function, creates only a 
handful of potential emissions equilibria that are feasible for a 
particular firm. In reality, the abatement co st  functions are likely 
to be smoother than the functions used in the model .  Second , the 
shares of permit holdings for the largest firm are likely to be 
underestimates . Among the major source categories in Los Angeles , 
abatement co sts are best known � and least likely to be overestimated 
-- for eiectr ic util ities . This means that even greater efficiency 
gains may be possible by substituting abatement elsewhere for the 
emissions reductions at utilities that are calculated from the 
existing co st data. 
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With these caveats in mind , the results in Table 1 illustrate 
the pos sibility of serious market imperfections , depending upon the 
selection ot an emissions target and an initial allocation of the 
permits .  Column A shows the cost-minimizing allocation of permits 
under the three emissions targets described above.  This al location is 
the competitive equilibrium. If the initial allocation process is an 
auction so that all firms are buyer s ,  the share of the largest source 
is the share shown in Column A. Other initial allocations can raise 
this figure substantially . For example,  suppose the al location is 
designed to retain present emissions levels and is a proportion of 
precontrol emissions . In this case , the largest source , assuming the 
market were competitive, would seek to increase its share of holdings 
by 20 percent of the total number of permits (the difference between 
48 percent on Line 1 Column A and the 28 percent share of baseline 
emissions ) .  This would make this source an almo st complete 
monopsonist,  e .g . ,  the only source of demand for permits at the 
competitive equilibrium price (almost all other firms would be 
sellers ) . The potential inefficiency of a monopsonist is that  it will 
systematically understate its demand in order to force the price of 
permits down. This is achieved by engaging in excessive abatement , 
the extra costs or which are made up in the etfects ot pushing down 
permit prices . 
Column B shows the results from the most extreme degree of 
monopsony that is possible for each of the three cases . Here it is 
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assumed that the largest source has an initial allocation of no 
permits ,  and that all other firms are given permits in a manner that 
causes them to seek to be sellers at any price equal to or above the 
monopsony equilibrium. The discreteness in the options available to 
the utility strong ly influence these numbers : the actual emissions 
produced in Lines 1 and 2 of Column B are identical , and in Line 3 the 
monopsony and competitive equilibria are the same. Such extreme 
results should not be expected to emerge in the real world.  
Nevertheless , the pattern of the results  a greater divergence 
between competitive and monopsony shares for higher total limits on 
emissions � is likely to be robust for this particular case.  The 
reason is that in the range of the competitive equilibrium for 
emis sions limits around the most stringent standard,  the supply of 
permits from other firms to the largest source is very elastic, even 
with discrete options in the abatement cost analysis . This undermines 
the opportunity of the monopsonist to take advantage of its high 
market share : overabat ement will not force much of a drop in permit 
prices , and hence the gains from the latter wil l not generate much of 
an offset against the higher abatement costs that are necessary to 
allow the firm to reduce its demand for permits . 
The tentative conclusion from this analysis is that for the 
particular case at hand, monopsony appears to be a serious design 
concern only if regulators do not conform to the existing ambient air 
quality standards . The actual allocation rule is certain to be less 
likely to cause monopsony than the extreme case analyzed here,  yet 
even under this extreme assumption imperfections in the permit market 
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appear relatively unimportant i f  the emissions limit is low. On the 
other hand , market imperfections could be important if existing 
permits were simply made tradable unless the initial allocation were 
designed to guard against it.  
Multiple Permits Markets 
Another important implementation issue is the degree of 
geographical resolution in the definition of an emis sions permit.  In 
the case of sulfates in Los Angele s ,  a permit could be defined as a 
license to emit a g iven amount of sulfur oxides anywhere in the air 
shed. Or , permits could have a varying value depending on the 
geographic location of the source holding them, with the relationship 
based upon estimates of the damage created by emissions from different 
sources.  Finally, the permits could be defined in terms of the 
resulting pollution at each of the seventeen sites at which air 
quality has been measured , with an air quality model being used to 
calculate the number of permits a given source must hold at each 
receptor site for each unit of emissions that it r elease s .  The last 
alternative is the most complicated to implement , for it requires that 
sources participate in seventeen markets and that the state be 
continuously available to run air quality simulations whenever any 
firm seeks to change its emissions . While such a system is difficult 
-- perhaps impo ssible -- to operate in the real world, its results can 
nevertheless be simulated . The differences between the first system 
(all emissions are treated equally) and the last system ( each receptor 
is associated with a separate market ) thus provides a measure of the 
potential gross gains from a fine-tuned method of def ining the permits . 
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Table 2 presents some of the results of these simulations . 16
TABLE 2 
COMPARISON OF UNIVERSAL AND RECEPTOR-SPECIFIC PERMITS 
( costs  in $ millions ) 
Baseline 
Emissions 
Target in I 
Tons/Day I 
so2 Equiv. I 
--
150 
250 
300 
Annualized Costs of Competitive Equilibrium Abatement for : 
A .  
Universal 
Permits 
682 
565 
515 
Receptor-Specific Permits that Produce:  
B .  I c.  
Same Air Quality I 
For Each Receptor I 
6 82 
557 
513 
Uniform Air Quality 
Equal to Worst Receptor 
6 82 
545 
505 
Source : Hahn, "An Assessment of the Viability of Marketable Permits . "  
The case analyzed here i s  one in which natural gas availablity 
is low. This case is likely to produce the greatest differences in 
abatement costs among various methods for organizing the permits 
market. Given the historically available gas supply to Los Angeles , 
abatement costs tend to be about 60 percent of the costs if natural 
gas supplies are low. Column A shows the annual ized expenditures on 
16 For a more complete analysis , see Hahn and Nol l ,  "Designing a 
Market for Tradable Emissions Permits . "  
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abatement co sts in the Los Angeles area under the competitive 
equilibrium distribution ot permits if there is no geographical 
resolution in the permit system. Column B shows the co sts if firms 
are required to buy pollution permits for each of the seventeen 
measuring stations in the air shed, subj ect to the condition that the 
air quality results at each station will be the same as the outcome 
from the system reported in Column A. Thus , the difference between A 
and B is·  the gain, if any , arising solely from geographical relocation 
of permits in a system that takes account of the specific polluting 
effects of emissions from each location in the region. 
Column C further relaxes the system, allowing pollution at all 
measuring stations to be constrained only by the air quality achieved 
at the most polluted station under the allocation corresponding to 
Column A.  Thus , emissions can be reallocated and total emissions 
increased as long as pollution does not increase at the location that 
is most po lluted under the Column A al location. Again, the results 
are affected by the discreteness  in abatement options assumed in the 
mode! ; however , the general result from the analysis is that there is 
little to be gained from fine-tuning the definition of permits.  The 
reasons are twofold:  the simple market al locates emissions relatively 
evenly over the region, and leaves relatively little differences among 
measuring stations in terms of the air quality results . Hence,  there 
is little opportunity for improving the efficiency of the allocation 
through adopting a more complicated market system. 
While these results may not be generalizable to other 
pollutants in other areas , they nevertheless suggest an important 
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lesson. In order for a tradable permits system to be able to capture 
SLgnif icant gains from a fine-tuned, complicated definition of permits 
and their marke ts , it is  .!!.Q.!;_ sufficient that different sources have a 
significantly different pattern of effects . It must also be the case 
that the equilibrium allocation of permits in a crude, simplified 
market be such that emissions would be concentrated in a particular 
location. 
If the comparison is to be made between a simple tradable 
permits system and the existing regulatory arrangement , the issue is 
whether a tradable permits system increases or reduces the geographic 
concentration of emissions compared to the present pattern. Because 
the present source-specif ic standards system tends to force some 
activities to overabate ( for example, electric utilities ) ,  while 
leaving other sources virtual ly unregulated, it should no t be 
surprising to find that a tradable permits system evens out the 
pattern or emissions in comparison to the present system, and 
therefore makes more even the geographical distribution of measured 
pol lution within a region. Moreover , if most sources face relatively 
low abatement costs for a substantial fraction of their emis sions , a 
market system wLll lead to substantial abatement from all sources . In 
such a case,  it should not be surprising to  find situations in which 
there is relatively little additional gain from moving from a simple 
to a complex system. 
Thin Markets 
The final major potential source of a failure in the permits 
market is that transactions will be too infrequent to convey 
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meaningful price signals to polluting firms , to make relatively easy 
the acquisition ot permits for entry and expansion of pol luting 
facilities , and to allow a firm to avoid the expense of organizing the 
market and engaging in extensive bilateral negotiation every time it 
desires to make a trade. This is an especial ly difficult design 
problem to get a f irm grip on in advance of operating the market ,  for 
the indicators of the extent of market transactions are so crude. One 
measure is the number of firms accounting for existing and expected 
emis sions. In Los Angeles ten companies account for approximately 85 
percent or the sulfur oxides emissions under current standards , 
assuming mobile sources are as signed to the oil refiners operating in 
the air sned . 17 Most major industrial polluters emit relatively small
amounts of sulfur, so that  the market for small quantities of permits 
is likely to be reasonably wel l-functioning ; however , a major 
expansion or entry of an oil r ef inery, an offshore oil terminal,  or an 
electric utility generation f acility would be especially difficult to 
accommodate because so few sources have sufficient numbers of permits 
to be potential ly signif icant sel lers to the new source . 
A second problem in anticipating the extent of a problem of 
market thinness is  that there is likely to be a systematic tendency to 
underestimate the pos sibilities for transactions . A substantial 
source or demand and supply in the market for permits wil l be factors 
that are not measurable in advance. Examples are innovations in 
abatement technology, entry , exit, contraction and expansion of 
17 See Cass , "Methods for Sulfate Air Quality Management with 
Applications to Los Ang eles . "  
43 
polluting entities, and opportunities for more efficient abatement 
methods that may be known to existing sources but that have not yet 
appeared in the public domain ( e .g . ,  process changes ) . 
In Los Angeles , the problem is even more difficult because the 
local air pollution control authority has explicitly adopted the 
pol icy of attempting to write standards in inverse order of their 
co sts per unit abatement . Thus , with few exceptions , the standards in 
place are the least expensive abatement methods available,  and the 
pending standards are the least expensive remaining pos sibilitie s .  
Consequently , most o t  the demand for trades ,  and the gains from a 
permits market, are unlikely to be measured using existing co st 
intormation. Therefore the extent to which the thinness  of the market 
is a potential problem is likely to be overstated. For example, g iven 
historical natural gas supplies and no abatement methods other than 
tho se whose co sts are known publicly, the annual cost savings from a 
competitive reallocation ot the emissions permits that are currently 
in place is estimated to save only about $20 million per year in 
abatement cost s ,  which is about 7 percent of the total . 1 8  This 
indicates a strong pos sibility of a thin market ,  indeed ; however, it 
is sure to be an underestimate of the potential saving s ,  and hence the 
desire to trade. 
Whether the market is thin, initial ly and in the future,  again 
depends on the design of the system. A few examples illustrate this 
point . ( 1) If existing emissions (or some proportion of them) are 
Its Calculations in Hahn, "An Assessment of the Viability of
Marketable Permits . "  
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simply made tradable, a thin market is a more likely prospect than if 
an auction process is used for the initial allocation. ( 2) Fine­
tuned, multiple-market systems are more likely to face a problem of 
thinness  than single markets defined over a broad geographic area. 
( 3 )  If permits are perpetual with no periodic reallocation process ,  a 
decision to make a maj or purchase or sale would then require that the 
firm wishing to make a market undertake the time and expense of 
organiz ing and negotiating a trade . At the other extreme, if permits 
have a fixed life and are reallocated by auction, a convenient time 
and place is established for facilitating major redistributions of 
permits should changes  in underlying economic and technological 
conditions warrant it . 
Selecting a Design: Conclusions 
The preceding discussion should make clear that selecting a 
design for a system of marketable emissions permits is not a purely 
technical , scientific matter. Working out the details requires 
considerable judgment , including an assessment of which risks a 
political entity would pref er to run . The following observations 
present an analysis of two polar cases : a design for sulfur oxides 
emissions in Los Angeles , an area in which information is 
comparatively rich, and a design for the general problem of emissions 
in control in an information-poor environment. 
In Los Angeles,  market imperfections apparently are a far more 
important design issue than is the selection of appropriate 
definitions for the geographical extent of a permits market.  Fine­
tuning the system in terms of multiple markets for sulfur emissions 
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promises little gains , yet there will be formidable problems of 
transactions costs and market structure.  Consequently , a system in 
which permits are simply stated in terms of allowable quantities of 
so2 equivalent emissions anywhere in the region appears to be the most
desirable.  
The Los Angeles air shed has a relatively large number of 
sources producing a smal l quantity of emis s ions , but only a dozen or 
so f irms account for about 85 percent of the total . Consequently, 
imperfectly competitive and thin markets are a potential problem for 
large transactions . The implication is that the method selected for 
initializing and maintaining the system should encourage an active, 
competitive market .  
The most attractive method for the initial al location is an 
auction mechanism. This provides a thick market ( all permits are 
transacted in the initial distribution) and, because all pol luters are 
placed on the same side of the market ,  it minimizes the likelihood of 
monopolistic imperfections. The mechanics of the proposed mechanism 
are as follows . Each source would be asked to write down the number 
of permits it would seek to purchase at each of several prices .  The 
firm would be free to choose as many price gradations as it wanted . 
It could write down one price-quantity pair ( e . g . , X tons per day at 
any price up to $Y per ton) . It could provide a step function of 
several jumps , such as X tons per day for prices between $Y and $Z ( $Y 
larger) ,  and X+W tons for prices below $Z.  Or,  it could bid a 
continuous demand function for permits .  Permits would then be 
allocated to the highest bidders at the quantities requested, 
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descending down the price bids until the permits were completely 
allocated .  Among the bids not receiving any permit al locations, the 
one with the highest bid price determines the price of all permits 
( e . g . , the al location mechanism is a second-price auction) . This 
process is the mo st likely theoretical ly to produce a competitive 
allocation or the permits . 
A separable equity issue accompanying the auction is the 
allocation of the net co sts of the permits.  Whereas the permit price 
determined above could actually be paid to the state , an alternative 
is to pay the revenues according to a previous ly arranged provisional 
permit a�location, as described above.  As a political matter, the 
chances of implementing a tradable permits system are probably greater 
if the revenues do not accrue to the governmental treasury , and if the 
provisional allocation of the rights to receive the revenues from the 
permit auction does not reward firms who have been most resistent to 
current environmental regulations.  For example, if ownership rights 
for purposes ot al locating the auction revenues were based upon 
emissions under current standards , firms that  had succeeded in 
f ighting regulation or that had managed to induce regulators to impose 
relatively undemanding standards on them would receive relatively 
large quantities of rights in emissions in comparison with firms that 
had been more cooperative and engaged in more co stly abatement 
techniques . From an equity standpoint , provisionally allocating the 
permits prior to the auction on the basis of either precontrol 
emissions or the expected competitive al location are both superior . 
The latter approach � estimating the competitive allocation and 
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granting ownership in permits on the basis of it � is more difficul t ,  
for i t  requires establishing in a formal regulatory process what the 
co st-minimizing allocation would be. This is comparable to setting 
source-specific emissions standards , and could be upset by the 
procedural requirements of the regulatory proces s .  I f  any single firm 
obj ected to the al location, the entire system could be delayed by 
continuing litigation until its appeals were resolved. 
The primary difficulty with a system based on precontrol 
emissions is that for one important source � oil ref ineries -- the
methods that they would adopt today with no regulation would produce 
far less emissions than the best methods of 1 970 . A method based on 
precontrol emissions would, in any event , end up giving most of the 
permits to oil companies ,  who would then probably sell them in large 
quantities and high profit to public and municipal utilities . This 
does not seem to be very acceptable political ly. 
Obviously , the equity aspects of initialization are thorny . 
Perhaps the best alternative is to base allocations on an amended list 
of existing emissions, with the few remaining uncontrolled sources 
being put through an emis sions standard process before the initial 
al location ot tradable permits is made . Whatever the choice , the 
allocation would proceed as follows. The ratio of target emis sions to 
the basel ine emissions would be calculated . Each firm would then 
receive a provisional allocation of permits equal to this ratio times 
its baseline emissions.  New or expanded sources would receive 
allocations based upon actual emissions when operations began. 
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After the provisional allocation is made, each firm would make 
bids on permits , and thereby receive a final allocation of emission 
permits according to its bids at the price of the highest excluded 
bid. The firm would pay for these permits at the established price,  
and receive revenues at the same price for the permits which it held 
provisional ly . The net payment for a particular source would be the 
product of the auction price and the difference between its final 
al location based upon the bidding procedure and its provisional 
allocation based upon precontrol emissions . For all firms taken 
together , the net payment would be zero . 
To provide a continuing opportunity for entry and expansion, 
permits could be separated into vintages according to useful life.  
The permits would be declared the binding control on emissions 
beginning at a specified date after the auction -- perhaps a year or 
two after it takes place to g ive sources ample time to engage in 
capital investments to accommodate their permit holdings . Al l permits 
could then be valid for another fixed period after the system is in 
place , such as for an additional year. Then, a predesignated portion 
of the permits could expire each year -- for example,  10 percent of 
the permits to expire each year . Prior to the expiration date, the 
regulators would determine how many permits would be iss ued to replace 
the expired one s ,  based upon considerations of cost and air quality. 
The new permits could be allocated by the same auction procedure as 
was used for the initial al location. Provisional al locations for 
purpo ses of distributing auction revenues would be based upon holdings 
of the expiring permits , but the final allocation would be based upon 
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a second-price auction. 
Between the formal auctions , government regulators could 
maintain a public f ile of the current holdings of permits of various 
vintages ,  and could serve as a clearinghouse for information about 
firms that wish to buy or sell their holding s .  More risk-averse f irms 
( or firms wanting a long-term emissions commitment ) could seek to sel l 
permits with short remaining lives and buy permits with longer live s .  
Entry and expansion o t  pol luting sources could s t i l l  take place 
through the clearinghouse ; however, the presence of an annual auction 
would probably end up being the primary mechanism for a new maj or 
source to acquire the necessary permits.  
The preceding mechanism appears to cope best with the specific 
design problems for the case at  hand. A key element of the Los 
Angeles problem, however,  is the finding that the geographic 
allocation of emis sions does  not make much difference in terms of 
satisfying air qual ity obj ectives . In the absence of information 
about the relationship between emis sions and air quality, or in a 
world in which localized effects are understood and known to be 
potentially important, how might the design of the system differ? 
The mechanism described above has several features that are 
well-suited to the case of poor information. First,  the periodic 
auction is the best way to protect against market imperfections owing 
to  either market concentra tion or market thinnes s .  Second, the 
concept ot having some of the permits expire each year is especially 
appropriate when the relationship between emis sions and air quality is 
poorly understood , because the process by which expiring permits are 
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converted into new ones allows the regulator continually to adj ust the 
number or permits (and hence air quality) . Of course,  the more 
uncertain are regulators about the emis sions to air quality 
relationship , the greater is the degree of variability in the number 
of permits that they would desire. One method for achieving greater 
poential for variability is to have two types of permits : long-term 
(perhaps ten year s ,  as above, or even perpetual) and short-term (as 
short as one year ) .  Whereas under the system described above only 10 
percent of the permits expire each year , with a two-permit system a 
much higher proportion could be assigned to the short-term category 
and therefore varied in quantity from year to year. A second use of 
short-term prmits would be to facilitate an economically efficient 
approach to achieving the ultimate air quality obj ective. Regulators 
could announce a strategy to reissue short-term permits at some ratio 
of new to expiring permits that is les s than one, thereby gradually 
winding down the total emissions in the area. The proces s  could be 
based upon an emis sions target that is established before the system 
begins to operate (assuming the relationship between emissions and air 
quality is known well enough to make this feasible) ,  or the winding 
down process could be open-ended, with regulators announcing a fixed 
percentage reduction in short-term permits until ambient air quality 
standards are achieved (or changed ) ,  
The preceding arrangements still leave unsolved one potential 
failing of a market in permits : the possibility of localized effects 
from a single or a few sources that elect to buy a large number of 
permits rather than to abate . Because this result in the context of a 
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permits market i s  a consequence of a co st-minimizing process of 
reducing emissions, the appropriate response to the problem may be to 
allow some degree of localized violations of air quality standards. 
Nevertheless ,  in the context of existing air pol lution regulation, 
rather than regulation seeking to make some sort of optimal trade-off 
between benefits and cost s ,  the ambient air quality standard is an 
inflexible policy obj ective. 
If enough firms contribute to a localized effect,  one po ssible 
solution is a system of multiple permits marke t s .  This would require 
a formal regulatory determination of the coefficients relating 
emissions to air quality for the relevant sources and localized 
pol lution hot spo t s .  As long as the number of these localized 
problems is relatively small, allowing firms to participate in only a 
few markets , this approach may prove workable.  But it would require a 
substantial evidentiary burden on the regulators in defining the 
permits , the market s ,  and the mathematical relationship of sources to 
each. In the absence of good information about the relationship 
between emissions and air quality, regulators may not be able to 
sustain such findings legal ly, or may be able to do so only after a 
long legal battle.  
A second , probably more fruitful approach is  to set  up a 
permit s market ,  but to overlay minimum standards on the sources that 
are suspected of having important local iz ed pol lution effect s .  Only 
very large sources or sources emitting at or near ground level can be 
expected to cause a violation of ambient air quality standards all by 
themselves ; hence regulators could deal on a case-by-case basis with 
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these sources .  The idea would b e  t o  let the permits market allocate 
emissions, but to set an upper bound on the number of permits that 
could be held by some specific sources or a lower bound on stack 
heights . These standards would be set according to the same 
procedural and evidentiary requirements that apply to the present 
source-specific regulatory standards ; however, the process of 
implementing them would not need to delay the implementation of a 
general permits markt . The long legal process to set an upper bound 
on a particular source could be underway while the market operated, 
and could be directed only at the major sources that in equilibrium 
were observed to hold a greater number of permits than the proposed 
upper bound . 
Any of the preceding systems -- numerous short-term permits , 
some standards overlaying the market for permits -- creates 
uncertainty among emissions sources in picking an optimal abatement 
strategy, or indeed in being willing to experiment with a change in 
the regulatory system for controlling emissions . Uncertainty about 
the future state of regulatory stringency affects the selection of 
abatement methods by a regulated entity -- both the total amount 
abated, and the choice among capital-intensive technologies versus 
changes in operating procedures . In general , uncertainty should make 
f irms somewhat more reluctant to abate at all,  and somewhat more 
likely to adopt more flexible abatement methods that al low relatively 
inexpensive adjustment s in emissions as policy changes occur.  
One good argument for a stable regulatory policy is  to  create 
a more certain decisionmaking environment for regulated firms . But if 
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long-term goals cannot be very accurately stated, either because the 
benefits or improved air quality are uncertain or because the 
relationship between emis sions and air quality is poorly understood , 
regulatory policy wil l produce a more efficient result if this 
uncertainty is transmitted to businesses by the regulatory system. A 
system that does not specify the long-run emissions goal , but that 
makes some measured change in emis sions over time (and that is 
ambiguous about the ultimate stopping point ) ,  wil l be more efficient 
if it encourages  more flexible abatement. methods . Consequently, 
although the politics ot the situation may prove intractable,  a design 
criteria for situations in which the amount of emissions to be allowed 
in an area is unknown ought to be to construct a permits system that 
conveys this uncertainty to polluting entitie s .  
III . DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE IN U . S .  POLICY 
In the late 1970 s ,  the Environmental Protection Agency began 
seriously to consider -- and then to encourage -- a policy of 
"controlled trading methods" in air pollution regulation. The idea 
was to introduce some elements of a market -- and its attendant 
flexibility -- into the standards-setting mode of regulation. Three 
such methods have been developed and, to a limited extent , 
implemented : "bubbles , "  "offsets , "  and "banks . "  
As discussed above, current regulatory practice i s  t o  set a 
standard for each source, with a source defined as a point from which 
emissions are released. For large , complex manufacturing processes , 
such as oil refining or steel making , a single plant can have several 
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separate sources . The bubble policy is an attempt to introduce some 
relaxation ot the exclusive focus on specific source s .  It enables a 
firm to reduce emis sions below the standard from one source and 
increase emissions from another at the same location if the effect is 
a net improvement in environmental quality. The term "bubble" was 
adopted to evoke the notion of placing a bubble around an entire plant 
and treating it as a single source, rather than as a series of 
independent source s .  
Bubbles are intended t o  deal with cost-minimizing 
reallocations of emis sions among sources at  the same facility. A 
similar concept for trade-offs between two facilities underpins the 
second policy, called offsets . An offset is a reduction in emis sions
below the standard in one facility that more than compensates for an 
increase in emissions at another in the same general area. An offset
is more like a normal market relationship , for the mechanism by which 
one firm induces another to reduce its emissions is to pay 
compensation. Because the otfset policy is oriented towards trade­
offs between two firms , the details of the transaction are expected to 
be the result of bil teral negotiations, rather than a transaction in a 
continuous ly operating centralized market .  
StLll closer t o  a normal market is an emissions bank. The 
bank policy provides a mechanism whereby a source can receive credit 
for an excess reduction in emissions without actually finding someone 
to whom it can sell the emis sions reduction. If a firm beats its 
emissions standards , it receives a credit in the emissions bank. 
Normal ly the amount of the credit is some fraction (near to but less 
than one ) of the reduction in emissions below the standard, so that 
the process effectuates a net reduction in emissions . Other firms , 
seeking to receive emissions permits,  then can purchase the banked 
credits by negotiating an agreement with one or more depositor s .  
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All o f  these n ew  policies are conceptual ly like tradable 
emissions permits in that they allow economic considerations to guide 
some reallocation of emis sions permits . But all are part of the 
standard-setting proce s s ,  rather than a substitute for it . Each trade 
must be approved by regulatory authorities in the normal permitting 
proce s s .  This normally requires information about the abatement 
technology to be ued at both the point where emissions are reduced and 
at the source increasing emissions . Moreover ,  except for the bubble 
policy, these methods take existing emissions standards as a baseline : 
neither trading partner in an offset or bank exchange can end up 
emitting more than the existing source-specific emissions the standard 
al low s .  Offsets and banks are seen a s  means for allowing entry and 
expansion of pollution sources when the source would cause a reduction 
in air quality even if it was in compliance with source-specific 
standards.  Thus , new or expanding sources can use offsets and banks 
to purchase emissions permits for the emissions they would release 
after having adopted the best abatement technology available to them. 
These policies do not relax uneconomic differences among old source 
categories ,  or between new and old sources ,  that are present in the 
existing system of source-specific standards . 
Offsets and banks also suffer from the absence of a formal 
method of organizing the market . Each depends on bilateral 
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negotiations, and each can expect infrequent transactions because only 
new or expanded maj or sources are candidates to engage in trades .  
Consequently, the transactions co sts for trades can be expected to be 
high, and problems of market imperfection are likely to emerge. 
Finally,  the status of traded emis sions permits is secondary 
to permits inherent in existing source-specific standards . The EPA 
guidelines for the controlled trading methods include provisions for 
situations in which ambient air quality standards are not satisfied 
after all sources are controlled . In general, if environmental 
qual ity objectives are not attained , all emissions permits are to be 
regarded as provisional and subj ect to change .  But traded emissions 
permits are to be the first to be examined for redefinition. For 
example, the guidelines governing the emis sions banks � the most 
market- like of the three options -- state that local air pol lution 
control agencies are to select among four alternatives if air quality 
objectives are not realized: ( 1) a moratorium on the use of permits 
obtained through the bank; ( 2) a revision on a source-by-source basis 
of the number of permits from the bank that are necessary to al low a 
given quantity of emis sions ( e .g . ,  a depreciation of the value of a 
permit ) ;  (3)  an across-the-board depreciation of the value of all 
traded permits ; or (4) a forfeiture of all traded permits . 19 Thus 
traded permits are required to bear the brunt of the uncertainties in 
environmental policy. Obviously, polluting entities can be expected 
19  Emission Reduction Banking Manual ,  Emission Reduction Banking 
and Trading Publication BG200 , U . S .  Environmental Protection 
Agency, September 1980 . 
to be reluctant to risk substantial capital investments on the 
validity of traded emissions permits .  
Th e  new trading methods offered by EPA should properly be 
regarded as a supplement to a continued primary reliance on source-
specific standards . For the reasons given above, they are not 
appropriately characterized as a system of marketable emissions 
permits . Instead, they are a mechanism whereby sources can 
col laborate to obtain some changes in source-specific emis sions 
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standards from local regulators , subj ect to some important conditions 
about the kinds ot changes that are feasible and the long-term status 
of the revised standards . They do not abandon the premise of the 
existing regulatory structure,  which is that in order to control 
pollution one must directly control every polluter. 
The argument for these changes in regulatory policy --
assuming that the problems with the existing system are major � must 
be primarily political , based upon the idea that controlled trading 
options are a necessary step in the transition from the old system to 
a new , market-oriented one . In this light ,  the controlled trading 
options have one major advantage over the designs discussed in the 
previous section: not everyone has to participate in the system and 
face the uncertainties inherent in it.  Local regulators can continue 
to set standards for every source , even when trades take place . A 
polluting entity can choo se to satisfy its current source-specific 
standards , avoid subj ecting itself to a market proce s s ,  and presumably 
live happily ever after in a blissful but expensive world of relative 
regulatory certainty . Assuming that regulators can avoid a policy 
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catastrophe, such as observing continued failure to satisfy ambient 
air quality standards and then voiding all traded permits , the 
presence of a functioning , and profitable,  permits trading system can 
induce more firms to enter offset or bank arrangements .  And,  as 
experience is gained, environmentalists and local regulators can 
develop more faith in decentralized decisionmaking , and exercise less 
and less scrutiny over the details of each transaction. Moreover, 
areas that do relax the source-by-source review process and 
essential ly permit any reasonable trade will gradual ly be rewarded by 
the flexibility the system allows for economic growth ,  perhaps forcing 
more reluctant regulatory authorities to go along . 
The major problem with this line of reasoning is that the idea 
of marketable permits may sink because the new trading methods are so  
procedurally freighted, so  limited in  applicability , and so burdened 
with uncertainties over the long-term value of the permits.  Too timid 
a reform leads to few transactions and market imperfections that 
undermine the efficiency of the trades that take place. Even in the 
absence ot a policy catastrophe, the system could prove so cumbersome 
that it is uninteresting to polluting entities , and hence does  not 
lead to the gradual transition to a true market system. 
In any event, at some point it is  likely to be desirable to 
make a major alteration in policy , regardless of which transition path 
to a market system is followed . That is the regularization of a 
market situation -- such as an auction -- that avoids source-by-source 
review and that facilitates trades by providing a thick market with 
low transactions co sts . This is the key to substantially improving 
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the efficiency of the environmental regulatory proces s  in the United 
States . Moreover ,  the method for implementing this change is the 
principal design issue that has thus far been ignored by policymakers 
and that must be addressed if an economically rational regulatory 
method is to be put in place . 
